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Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 3281

  • From: Nancy Paschen
    Organization(s):

    Comment No: 8865
    Date: 3/22/2010

    Comment Text:

    i0-001
    COMMENT
    CL-08865
    From:
    Sent:
    To:
    Subject:
    Attach:
    Nancy Paschen
    Monday, March 22, 2010 1:04 PM
    secretary ; Penner, William
    Comment Letter
    2010 0322.pdf
    Good afternoon,
    Attached is a Comment Letter regarding Regulation of Retail Forex.
    Nancy PaschenMarch 22, 20!0
    Via E:-mail:
    secreta
    Mr, {:)avid Stawick
    Seci:etar,i
    Co nmodfty Ft;tures Trading Commission
    [f~ree t..afayette Centre
    1155 2 !st StreeL NW
    Wasiqington, DC 20581
    Re:: ~ulation of Retail Forex
    Dear Mr. otaw~ck.
    N:ationa! Futures Association (TNFAI')appreciates the opportunity to
    comment on the Commission's proposed ruies regarding the regulatioi~ of off-exchange
    retail foreign currency transactions (,'fore×~')~ N FA appiauds the Commission
    proposing these ruies, which will both provide impo.dant protections to retail cust:omers
    :and b,,:ir~g greater" ~egu]atory certainty to the retai~ fomx industry: Below NFA addresses
    a few of the n'!ore important aspects of ~he Commission's proposed rulemaking i~ areas
    i-elating to security deposits, trading practices~ and the mandated registration
    requirements.
    ~he Commission proposes that retail foreigr~ :exchange dealers (."R~.t::Ds)
    and certain futures commission merchants {"FCMs") acting as forex: counterpa..'ties
    co~tect arid maintain security deposits eauai to ten percent of the notional valueo
    -*,
    each
    f:orex trar:sa:ction with a retaii customer :: As you are aware NFA initially adopted
    in proposing its security deposi~ ievel~ the ¢" "~ ' " "'
    .
    leverage limitations and that FINRA has propose:d to lim.i~ the maximum leverage:
    I~m~tat~on on certa~ re:tail forex transactions offered by broke>dealers to 4 ~o 1. NFA
    notes that FINRA may have a greater interest in ~ddressir}g the financia~ in:tegdty
    protec~ior~ o:bject~ve solely through a security deposit ~eq~.~¢eme:n{ and. t,~e,:.efc~e, seta
    higher percentage since FINRA broker~dealers engaging n reta forex are not subject
    to a $20 mi~iion minimum net cap~ta~ requirement. Moreo,e~, NFA also
    ~-.INRA s percentage. ~evel may be higher s~nce: I:INRA has
    ,=a~-~ sought, to aJd.:Davtd
    March
    "~~
    zz, 2010
    own security deposit ~equirements for re:rex transactions in 2003 when 1,i~e Forex Deale~"
    Member t""~rh"~""~-, ~'~: ~ minimum ~et capita~ requ~ement was $250,000. NFA ~qnancial
    Requirements Section 12 mandates that NFA's ~orex Deaf~r Member~ collect 1,:~ of the
    not ona! value of t~ansactions ~n ten d~flerent major currencies
    2
    and
    ~ ~; o~ ~ the notiona~
    value of transactions in other currencies.
    In adopting our requirements we were guided by two public poi:icy
    objectives----the financial integrity of FDMs and the protection of retai~ customers who
    engage in these principaf4o-principal transactions Satisfaction of these two obieciives
    iled us to establish security deposit percentages that were approximately in line with the
    then existing margin requirements for exchange4raded foreign currency futures at the
    Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME"), NFA's security deposit requirements, like the
    SPAN margin levets set by CME recognize that currencies can have d~ffering risk and
    leveis of ,,/ota~iiity Because of these factors, NFA established the security deposit
    requirement for transactions in the major currencies at a iower percentage than
    transactions in more exotic currencies.
    Over the years NFA has found that our security deposit req{.~irements
    have se.,ved our two public polic~ objectives ',,,,ell. As to fir~ancial i~tegnty, NFA's
    security deposit ~equirements help protect, ir~ part, forex coun[e~parties from absorbing
    losses of defa~.~lting customers which, if significant, could affect the counterparty's
    capital and put the fl~nds of other customers at risk, Althe~gh the prevention of
    counterparty default is always of paramount concern, tile lack of bankruptcy protections
    afforded to f~rex customer funds significantly heightens this concern.
    customer p~o[ection objective separately by adopting t!~e extensive risk disclosures
    requirements already in place by NFA and the new customer pe.dormance disdosL~res
    proposed by the Commission
    Major currencies that qualify for the ! % security deposit are the British pound,
    the Swiss franc, the Can:adia~ dollar, ti~e Japanese yen~ the Euf:o, the Austlaiian
    the New Zealand dollar, the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone, and the Danish
    krone
    2D.a'~ d Stawick
    March 2~, ~s010 ....
    To date~ we are not aware of a[~y situat:ions in which an FDM's ,.ap~tat has
    been impaired due to its failure to collect customer debits. Of course, we aiso recognize
    that f,.,rex cour~terpa~ties generally use rea~t~me systems for co~ ect~ng security deposits
    so that as a posit~or~ moves against a customer the counterparty dFaws on resewes
    from the cu:stomer~s accot~nt to maintain the secud~, deposit ~eve~ of 1% or ~'~.
    applicable. Addit onally, as the Commission recognizes, under cL~rrent a[~to4iqu~dat~on
    practices forex counter~,a~es usualty close out custome~ positions before an account's
    losses exceed ks in~tia~ investment. These autoq~quidation practices, imp emented by
    mos~ firms, disfing~sh the ~eta~i OTC forex f~om exchar~ge t~aded futu~res. Our
    expects, nee : ndl .,at~s, howe,~'er, that not all I::DNs have implemented these close..out
    practices and. therefore~ a forex counterpady's financial protection remains an:
    appropriate #ubfic policy rationale for a security deposit requiremenL
    As noted above. NFA.~ second pubtic pc!icy obiectwe relates to * ~--:c~
    protection and sales practices. We agree with the Commission that at ce~a~n ieve[~age
    ratios even minor fluctuations ~n volatile currency markets can res~.~lt ~n customers
    havi~g their poskions liquidated w~th significant trading ~osses resu!t~ng--much faster
    .
    Commission s proposed ~:ule ~. ~ o~,
    t,~s~.m,~,:~ may realize. Of co{J~se, the
    ~
    ~" ' '
    ~ ....
    ~";
    relating to t!ie qua~fferly disclosure of c~4stoi~er account pedormanoe also serves as a
    tool to satisfy th~s customer protection object~ve, and ensnares that "=' ;:
    . .
    ~t~a~: customers have
    a futi understanding of the attendant r~sks and ~everage ~nvo!ved ~n these transacfio~s
    so that they may make ar] ~nfom~ed decis~o~, Th~s is padicutady important ~r} these
    counterparty transactions where an RFED or FCM is on the opposite side of the
    transaction, wh ch d~ffers from an excha~ige traded transaction ~n w!~ch an FCM acts
    oniy as an ~ntermed~ary~ NFA encourages the Commission [o consider the ~mpact of
    t,:,~s
    d~sc~osure, ~f adopted, in formulating ~ts security deposit requirements.
    Although, fo~ [he reason explained betowl NFA has not changed the
    percentages in our security deposit requirements=, we have amended Fir}ancial
    Requirements Section '12 in an effort to bolster this second public policy objective.
    Specitically, in February 20:09, NFA etiminated a prior exem.ption for certain highly
    capitalized FDMs from colleding security deposits. At that time, eight of NFA's 21
    FDMs had an exemption from collec~:ing minimum security deposits. Of these eight, one
    offered leverage of 700: I, four offered leverage of 400:i, two offered leverage of 200:1,
    and one offered leverage o~ 50: !, One of the firms witho~.~t tt'~e exemption also off~'.~red
    leverage of 50:1. Based on our experience, a proportionately greater number of theNFA
    David Stawick
    Ma. ch 2~:~ z, 3 ~ 0 ........
    firms that offered higher leverage had also beer'., the subjects of NFA complaints, while
    neither: of ttie firms that offered 50:1 !overage had ever been the subject of an NFA or
    CFTC enforcement action. These statistics not only indicate that higher leverage ~atios
    can lead to abuses but also: ~ndica~e that FDMs can compete wh~le offerir~g leverage of
    t00:1 or less. In eliminating th~s exemption, NFA was cognizant of the ~mportance of
    balancing :customer protection with both dornest~c a:nd foreign competitive: conc.erns~
    :~
    padicu~ady when ~egu}ations in this area. could easily ddve U.S. cus[omers overseas [o
    ~ess regulated trading venues,
    NFA acknowledges tt~at the Commission in proposing it:s security deposit
    requiremer}ts retied upon the same two public policy obiectives as NFA. Therefore, we
    encourage the Comm~s.~lon to foitow two basic: guidelines in ado~)ting final requirements
    in this area th:a,. ~;7~ a!so found beneficial~
    First, since the foreign c{4rrency market is not static~ NFA recommer~ds
    ttiat the Commission reject a one*size4its~all approach to estabtishii-,,g security deposit
    req~Jirements; Based upon currency risk and volatility factors~ NFA be!ieves that
    security deposit requirements should recognize differences between certain currencies.
    Therefore, NFA recommends that the Commission adopt a~: approach similar to NFA's
    current requirements that appties a different percentage to separate: cur:rency categories
    or groupings based on currency risk and voiatility factors,
    ~
    We also be!ieve that setti!~.g
    a different percentage amount for each individual currency may be an al[emative but is
    obviously more complicated to administer
    NFA notes thata major U.S. bar~k offers retail forex trading with security deposit:
    amounts ranging from 2% to 8% depending on the cu[rency
    NFA notes that the Investment tndust@, Regulatory Orga~iza~ion of Canada
    (~':IIROC") takes a similar approach in setting forex margins, Specificaliy~ the IIROC totai
    margin requirement includes three componen~s.....a spot risk margin requirement, a term
    risk margin requiremer'..t:, and a margin surcharge mechanism which adjusts the margin
    rate for a specific currency if the volatility of the currency' exceeds a predetermined
    historic volatility ti~reshold. Current margin rates are EURIUSD: 3:%: USDICAD:: 3%:
    USD!GPD: 3.4%; USD!JPY: 3%~ and CAD/SGD: 10%.David Stawl,..k
    March 22, 20!0 ....
    Second, whoever sets the security deposit percentage levetso---:the CFTC
    or an SRO--:should recognize that the Iequirements must be flexible: a!~d conti~uatly
    eva!uated and adjusted, if necessary; For example, pursuant to NFA Fir~ancial
    Requirements Section t2, NFA's Executive Committee has the: autlqority to adjust NFA!s
    security deposit requirements under extraordinary ma;ket conditions. Even absent
    e×traordina,req~irements shoutd be periodicatiy reviewed and adjusted, if necessary.
    To t!~at end, NFA regularly compares our security deposit percentages to
    the CME's margin requirements, and we review our requirements ~n l~ght of the
    prevailing practices ~n the forex market. As NFA noted ir~ our February 2% 2009
    submission le~er to: the C~:TC regardin
    9
    the
    .amendments to Financial Requirements
    Section 12's security deposit: requirements, CME margins are h~gher ~han they were at
    the t~me Section 12 was adopted. Specificafly, as of December 24, 2008~ margins for
    the major cunenc~es averaged 5.6% and ranged from 3.5% to 8.2%. Margk~s for ttqe
    other currencies averaged 8.1% and ra[}ged from 3.2% to 12.5%. A more recent
    :analysis shows that margins for ~he majo~ currencies averaged 3.4% a~d ranged f~om
    2:3% ~o 5:4%. Margins for the other currencies averaged 5.7% and ranged from 3.0%
    to 8.1%.~ Given the 2008 data, NFA recognized ~n early 2009 that NFA Financial
    Requirements Sodden 12's secE~dty deposit percen[ages could be adjusted upward but
    we resisted proposing these changes pending the Commission':s proposed secudty
    deposit rutes.
    NFA appreciates the Comrn{sslo, ,~s efforts in balancing ratio[is competing
    interests and regulatory o.bjectives in estabiishing security deposit requirements. NFA
    encourages the Commission to reco~a..nize~ tt~e differei~,t market
    r sKs
    ":~
    and volatility, posed
    by d fferent currencies and adop[ " "
    ~
    '
    requl[e~t:ents ~efiective of those differences as
    exchanges routinely do in establishing t:he~r margin ~evels~ Addit~onatiy, regardless of
    who sets the security: depos~l: requirements and the percentage amo:unt~s) NFA urges
    the ~omm~ss~on to endorse or adopt so~tie mec!~ai!ism to a~ow for periodic review and
    adjustment of the requi~ements ifne~es~ary.s,
    An analysis of listed currency contracts on NASDAQ OMX, formerly the
    Philadelphia Board or Trade. reveals an average margin of 1:3 z~, ranging from .99 ~o to
    1.~,a7°4,,~, fo~ major currencies and a margin of 6.27% for the Mexican, '~ Peso~David Stawick
    March 22~ 20t0 .....
    Trading Practices
    The Commission's proposed Rule 5. i8(0(3)requi~es that ira fo!;ex
    co~lnterparty provides a ne~,~ bid p:ice that is higher or Rower it must also provide a new
    ask price that is eq:uatly higher or lower. NFA futly supports this proposed rule but urges
    the Commission to ciari~ the proposal to ensure that all requote practices are objective
    and evenhanded and that a counterparty that requotes customers must do so
    regardless of the direction in ,,~Thich the market has moved and have in p!ace
    symmetrical tolerance t:hresholds for requoting. Additionatfyi NFA recommends tt~at ~he
    Commission also require: counterparties to disclose to customers how orders that reach
    the platform a[a price no longer available are handled. A~ this lime, NFA also
    e:~courages the Commission to carefuily consider any comments it might receive from
    fore× cou:nterpa~ies regarding the pro:posed trading practices requirements to ensure
    that they are appropriately crafted to meet both regulatory objectives and forex business
    practices
    Re~istra[ion
    For many years= NFA advocated :that persons introducing forex accounts,
    managing fo[ex accounts= or operating pools t[ading forex should have to register with
    the Commission. Requiring forex intermediaries to register with the Commission as
    introducing brok:e~s ("lBd*): commodity trading advisors ("CTAs"), or commodi[y pool
    operators ("OPOsi'): as applicable: is an extremely impoitant customer protec~.::ion
    [eature. NFA also believes that the following technical amendments wi!l provide greater
    ciarity in the forex registration area.
    The Commission!s proposed rules provide that either an RFED or an FCM
    that is primadiy and substantialiy engaged in traditional futu[es actiivity may act as a
    forex counterparty. The proposal requires any t B introducing retail forex accounts to an
    RFED or FCM that is primarily and su['~stantiatiy engaged in traditional futures activity to
    be guaranteed by that RFED or FCM. NFA believes that ti~e Commissio~
    ~,
    intends to:
    require a forex IB gua[anteed by an RFED to open and carry customer accounts
    exclusiveiy with that RFED; As drafted, the proposed rules do not make this ctear. NFA
    :recognize.~ that in August 2007 the Comm:ission~s Division of C!earing and intermediary
    ©versight issued a,'-', advisory that. among other things, indicated tt~at Rule 1,57
    encompasses ~orex transacfions, but at that time the RFED counterparty category had
    6Day d Stawick
    March 22~ 20I 0 ......
    not: been created and, therefore, the advisory only refers to guarantor FCMs, Moreover,
    Commission Rule ! .57(a)(1) would appear to impose thi.~ exclusivity requirement on
    as to FCM guarantors: but not RFEDsl NFA recommends that Ru!e t.57 be amended
    to referenc:e both FCMs and RFEDs: or alternatively a new rule adopted to provide the
    required c!arity.
    NFA also believes that there are additiona! issues relatir~..} t~_) an RFED's
    guarantee of forex lBs that require more ciarity. Pursuant to the proposed rules, if a firm
    engages ~n retail fo~ex and conducts a minimal amount of omexchange business that is.
    not enough to meet the "pdmarfi:~, and substantially engaged" criteria, it must also be
    registered as an FCM to engage ~n omexchange futures. Further~ an RFED ~s
    prohibited from entedng into a guarantee agreeme[~t with an 1B that conducts on--
    exchange futures business because an RFED a~one cannot engage in exchange..~.raded
    futures business. Therefore, as written, the proposal creates some uncertai~ty
    ~e.gardin9 who an RFED that is also registered as an FCM {"RFEDfFCM".t may
    guarantee. For exam#le, if an IB only conducts on-exchange futures actwities, may at'.,
    RFE.DIFCM guarantee the IB pursuant to its FCM registratior~? Additionatly, if an ~B is a
    "dual*purpose IB" that conducts bott~ forex and on-exchange futures business may the
    RFEDiFCM guarantee the IB? Finally, if an IB onty conducts on-exchange futures
    business as an IB but is a~so registered as a CPO or CTA for purposes of manag!ng
    forex accounts o~ operating fo~ex pools, ma'~' an RFED!FCM guarantee the IB? NFA
    believes that RFEDiFCMs should be permitted to guarantee IBs under the three
    circumstances described and requests that the Commission's final rules address these
    registration perm utations
    ~
    Lastly= NFA strongly encourages the Commission to provide firms with
    adequate time to register or comply once its rules become final and effective. Time wit!
    be necessar',/for not o[',fy new entrants but also current registrants if the Commission's
    ~-ules are adopted as pt-oposed. For example NFA cu~ently has over 100 independent
    introducing brokers ("IB]") Members that engage in retail forex activities. Many of these
    NFA recognizes that the Commission's fina! rules cou!d permit guaranteed and
    nomguaranteed fBs to introduce fo~ex accounts., possibty :satisfying its cust:omer
    protection objectives by [equiring non-guaranteed forex IBs to maintain a higher capitai
    requirement than independent ~Bs dealing in exchange-traded products, Even in such a
    case.~ these questions must be addressed with regard to guaranteed IBs.NFA"
    fim~s are also engaged in exchange4raded futures activities. As noted above, the
    Commission's proposed rules require any IB that introduces reta:if forex accotmts to an
    RFED or FCM that ~s primarily and substantially engaged ~n ex~ha~ge..t, ad~u: futures
    activity to be guaranteed by that RFED or FCM. Therefore, NFA's current lBIs may
    have to sign~ficar~tly alter their business: For example; if an IBI " ~ ~,curr#nt~y introd~ices its
    retai~ fo:rex accounts to an RFED o~ FCM~on~y fimq that ~s pdmad~y and substantially
    e:qga:ged in exchange4raded futures activity: then the IBI must~(!)become a
    gL~a:rante:ed IB of that RFED or FCM; (2) cease engag:ing ~n [eta~f~ forex activities and
    remain ~ndepende ~t: or (3)find another R:F~D or FCM,only firm that w~4 gt~arantee
    NFA commends the Commission and its staff for putt!rig forth p~oposed
    retail fore× requirements thal. wilt provide greater protection to fore× customers and
    regulatory ce~ainty to firms engaging in ~retai! forex tra~.sactions. As always, NFA
    stands ready to assist the Cornmissior~ in this endeavor, if you have any questions
    concerning this ~ette{, please do not hesitate to :contact: me at (312) 781d 413 or
    cc: William