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Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 3281

  • From: Alexis L Hall
    Organization(s):
    Ruddy Law Office PLLC

    Comment No: 8619
    Date: 3/19/2010

    Comment Text:

    io-ooi
    COMMENT
    CL-08619
    From:
    Sent:
    To:
    Subject:
    Attach:
    Alexis Hall
    Friday, March 19, 2010 3:35 PM
    secretary
    Regulation of Retail Forex
    FX Solutions, LLC Comment Letter.pdf
    Alexis L. Hall*
    Ruddy Law Office, PLLC
    1225 15th Street NW
    Washington, DC 20005
    (202) 797-0762
    (202) 318-0543 (fax)
    www. ruddvlaw, com
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    under Federa~ tax ~aw. Member, New York State Bar and District of Columbia Bar.Saddle River Executive Centre.
    Route :t7 South Suite 260. Saddle River, N.1 07458.
    Phone: 20:t-345-22:t0 Fax: 20:t-345-22:t:t
    Via Hand Delivery and E-mail ([email protected])
    Mr. David Stawick, Secretary
    Commodity Futures Trading Commission
    1155
    21
    st
    Street, NW
    Washington, DC 20581
    Re:RIN-3038-AC61
    Dear Mr. Stawick:
    FX Solutions, LLC ("FX Solutions") appreciates the opportunity to comment on the rule
    proposed on January 20, 2010 by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") "Regulation of
    Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Intermediaries.
    ''1
    As a National Futures
    Association ("NFA") registered FCM that has operated as a forex counterparty since 2002, we believe our
    perspective and tenure affords us an opportunity to provide constructive comment on the CFTC's
    proposed efforts to better regulate the forex industry.
    FX Solutions strongly supports the CFTC's initiative to properly regulate the forex market.
    Accordingly we support a majority of the CFTC's proposal. FX Solutions fully supports the comments of
    the Foreign Exchange Dealers Coalition ("FXDC") in its forthcoming comment letter regarding the
    Regulation of Retail Forex. We do, however, oppose additional aspects of the proposed rules, which we
    set forth in detail below.
    I.
    Proposed Rule 5.9 Regarding Leverage
    Proposed Regulation 5.9 would require forex dealers to collect a security deposit equal to ten
    percent of the notional value of the retail forex transaction. The CFTC believes that this regulation will
    reduce retail forex customers' exposure to risk.
    With respect to Proposed Regulation 5.9, we reiterate and fully agree with the points set forth by
    the FXDC. In addition to the items expressed in FXDC's letter, we have a few additional comments,
    which are outlined below.
    The proposed rule regarding leverage is based on the mistaken belief that margin is for the
    protection of customers. In actuality, margin is for the protection of FCMs. In fact, the CFTC, has held
    that the concept of margin results from the "desire that futures commissions merchants have adequate
    1 FederalRegister,
    Vol. 75, No. 12, pp. 3282-3330.Mr. David Stawick
    March 19, 2010
    Page 2
    means to assure their own financial integrity and thereby contribute to the financial integrity of the entire
    marketplace.
    ''2
    Though the CFTC itself recognizes the true purpose of margin, it now seeks to use it as a
    mechanism to reduce customer exposure to risk.
    In attempt to reduce customer exposure to risk, the CFTC is ignoring its objective to protect
    customers from the fraudulent acts of industry professionals, and is, instead, attempting to protect
    customers from themselves. The proposed rule regarding leverage will, in essence, prohibit customers
    from making their own economic decisions. The ultimate decision regarding a customer's risk tolerance
    should remain with the customer.
    Since decisions regarding risk tolerance are best left to the customers, adequate customer
    protection can be derived from proper disclosure. Like commodity futures dealers, forex dealers are
    already required to provide customers with risk disclosure statements. The practice of providing risk
    disclosure statements to customers has been deemed an appropriate and adequate customer protection for
    decades in the futures trading industry. Since the CFTC has not established any basis for holding forex
    dealers to higher standards than futures dealers, the provision of risk disclosure statements should be
    sufficient in the forex industry as well. Accordingly, imposing a blanket ten percent margin requirement
    is unwarranted.
    II.
    Guarantee Agreements
    A.
    Requiring Guarantee Agreements Conflicts with the Intent of Congress
    Prior to 1982, FCMs regularly used agents to solicit business. These agents sometimes made
    misrepresentations and engaged in other wrongful acts, which caused harm to customers. As these agents
    frequently had little capital, injured customers were often left without recourse. Consequently, the CFTC
    sought an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act, pursuant to which FCMs would be held liable for
    the acts of agents.
    Congress recognized that these agents were, for the most part, independent firms. As such, FCMs
    could not exercise adequate control over these entities. As a result, Congress dismissed the notion that
    FCMs should be held liable for the acts of agents. Instead, Congress created the IB registration category.
    Congress determined that registrants in the new IB category should be held accountable for their own
    conduct and established certain requirements to ensure such accountability. 3
    Requiting guarantee agreements between IBs and RFEDs or FCMs would make RFEDs and
    FCMs accountable for the actions of IBs. Thus, it appears that the CFTC is seeking to reargue the issue
    of accountability, but this time it is doing so in the forex arena. The CFTC has not established any
    reasoning behind applying more stringent standards to the forex industry. Thus, as the CFTC has failed in
    its endeavor to hold FCMs liable for the actions of IBs in the futures arena, it must also fail in the forex
    arena.
    Baker v. EdwardD. Jones & Co.,
    Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶21,167 at 24,772 (C.F.T.C. 1981).
    FederalRegister,
    Vol. 48, No. 150, p. 35248.Mr. David Stawick
    March 19, 2010
    Page 3
    B.
    Guarantee Agreements are Alternatives to Meeting Net Capital Requirements
    In furtherance of the goal to hold IBs accountable for their own conduct, Congress established a
    minimum net capital requirement with the idea that such a requirement would "guarantee the
    accountability and responsible conduct of introducing brokers.
    ''4
    IBs that maintained the required
    minimum net capital were classified as independent.
    Congress held that in lieu of meeting the minimum net capital requirement, an IB could become
    guaranteed by entering into a guarantee agreement with an FCM.
    5
    Congress noted that "the purpose of
    the guarantee agreement is to enable the introducing broker to meet the alternative adjusted net capital
    requirement .... ,,6 The legislative history surrounding guarantee agreements makes clear that guarantee
    agreements are to be used in lieu of, and not in conjunction with, meeting the minimum net capital
    requirement.
    By providing IBs with the option to either meet the minimum net capital requirement or enter into
    a guarantee agreement, Congress created two separate and distinct categories of IBs. When assessing an
    FCM's liability for an IB, a clear distinction between independent and guaranteed IBs has been made.
    With respect to independent IBs, liability will attach to an FCM where there has been a failure of a duty
    to supervise.
    7
    An FCM will not be required to supervise the activities of an independent IB, unless it is
    has been shown that the independent IB was a de facto branch office of the FCM or an agent in the
    common law sense of the term. 8 The CFTC now seeks to ignore the concept of the independent IB and
    require all IBs in the forex industry to enter into guarantee agreements. Requiring guarantee agreements
    will make FCMs and RFEDs liable for the actions of IBs regardless of the relationship between the two.
    Additionally, when determining whether an FCM should be held liable for the actions of an IB,
    courts have emphasized the necessity of a case-by-case examination of the relationship between the FCM
    and the lB. By requiring guarantee agreements, forex dealers will always be held liable for the actions of
    the IBs. This outcome completely ignores the long history of analyzing such issues on a case-by-case
    basis.
    III.
    The Closing Out of Offsetting Long and Short Positions
    Pursuant to proposed Regulation 1.46, forex dealers engaging in off-exchange retail forex
    transactions would be required to close out offsetting long and short positions in an off-exchange retail
    forex customer's account. Unlike existing Regulation 1.46, the requirement that RFEDs and FCMs close
    out offsetting positions would apply regardless of whether a customer instructs otherwise.
    The CFTC believes that keeping open long and short positions in a retail forex customer's
    account removes the opportunity for the customer to profit on the transaction, increases the fees paid by
    the customer, and invites abuse. Despite this contention, there is actually no economical distinction
    4!d.
    ~ FederalRegister,
    Vol. 48, No. 150, p. 35264.
    6Id.
    7 In re BigRed Commodity Corp.,
    Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶22,263 (C.F.T.C. 1985);
    Reedv. Sage Group, Inc.,
    Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶23,943 (C.F.T.C. 1987)
    ~ In re Big Red Commodity Corp.,
    Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶22,263 (C.F.T.C. 1985);
    Reed v. Sage Group, Inc.,
    Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶23,943 (C.F.T.C. 1987).Mr. David Stawick
    March 19, 2010
    Page 4
    between commodity futures and forex transactions with respect to offsetting long and short positions.
    Consequently revising the rule in the context of forex makes little sense.
    Absent a prohibition spread trades are common in the marketplace due to variable demand for
    two positions and the ability to capture a gain on a change in spread positions. Additionally, spread
    transactions are generally recognized as a more conservative method of investing than a one-side-only
    transaction. Thus, at minimum customers should be able to instruct an forex dealer not to close out
    offsetting long and short positions.
    As previously expressed, FX Solutions strongly endorses the CFTC's initiative to properly
    regulate the forex industry. For the reasons stated above, we do, however, oppose proposed regulations
    1.10, 1.46 and 5.9.
    Thank you for your time and consideration of our points. Please do not hesitate to contact us if
    you with to further discuss our views.
    Sincerely,
    FX Solutions, LLC
    By:
    Michael Cairns
    Chief Executive Officer
    Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman
    Hon. Michael Dunn, Commissioner
    Hon. Jill E. Sommers, Commissioner
    Hon. Bart Chilton, Commissioner
    Hon. Scott D. O'Malia, Commissioner
    Division of Clearing and Intermediary Oversight
    Ananda Radhakrishnan, Director
    Office of the General Counsel
    Dan Berkovitz, General Counsel
    Mark E. Ruddy, Ruddy Law Office, PLLC
    Susan Molinari, Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP