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Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 3281

  • From: honguyencomcast
    Organization(s):

    Comment No: 3623
    Date: 1/24/2010

    Comment Text:

    i0-001
    COMMENT
    CL-03623
    From:
    Sent:
    To:
    Subject:
    [email protected]
    Sunday, January 24, 2010 8:49 PM
    secretary
    Regulation of Retail Forex: RIN 3038-AC61
    David Stawick, Secretary
    Commodity Futures Trading Commission
    1155 21 st Street, N.W.,
    Washington, DC 20581
    Regarding
    RIN 3038-AC61
    FX is probably one of the least volatile traded assets in the global capital markets, which is why
    current regulations allow up to 100:1 leverage, the highest leverage of anything I have seen.
    However, proposed 10:1 leverage is overkill, because this could widen bid/ask spreads, and
    therefore dry up liquidity. Compare this to current fixed-income futures trading, that leverage is
    around 100:4 ... which is 25:1
    What Iwantto know is whether this proposed new leverage also applies to institutions, ikeCTAs
    or hedge funds.
    I strongly support regulations in instruments that are responsible for the 2008 creditcnsis: credit
    derivatives, credit structured products, and risky debt instruments such as high-yield loans.
    I don't think it's necessary to change/modify any regulations for FX trading, because: 1) FX has
    some of the lowest volatilities compared to equities and fixed-income, and .. 2) FX is absolutely
    innocent of any boom/bust cycles throughout the 20th century and this century. Crises
    involving LTCM (fixed-income arbitrage), Amaranth (commodities), Bear Stearns (subprime
    mortgages), AIG (credit derivatives) and Lehman Brothers (mortgages and credit derivatives) have
    zero FX footprint or exposure. Black Monday in 1987 was a result of excessive stock speculation,
    which caused new regulations such as 2:1 leverage in equities. The Tequila Crisis in 1994 was a
    result of too much debt in Latin America, somewhat similar to too much mortgage debts in 2008.
    However, I woud be sympathetic if you want to reduce maximum leverage to something like 80:1,
    but 10:1 is absolutely counterproductive. I honestly believe that if 10:1 were to become law, it will
    creep back up to 30:1 not long after. And eventually it might go even higher.
    If the CFTC wants to experiment with new regulations, let's start at 80:1 ... and give it a year to
    see how it works compared to other assets, before we do anything further.
    Let's not over-react in FX, but instead focus regulations on Glass-Steagall and credit
    derivatives/structured products and risky debts.