I. CURRENT SWAP CLEARING REQUIREMENT-RELATED QUESTIONS	
Are market participants concerned about access to clearing for certain swaps that are subject to the Clearing Requirement? If so, are there any Commission actions or regulatory amendments that could facilitate	No iccurs with access for swans under the CD, though LIPOR swans may experience
	1
the IBOR transition for market participants?	liquidity issues as a result of the shift.
2 Please discuss recommendations for how the Commission should modify its Clearing Requirement under Commission regulation 50.4 and any related advantages or disadvantages (including anticipated costs) the	
might be expected from a specific approach.	sufficient notice of implementation.
More specifically, should the Commission modify the termination date range, or any other specifications, with respect to SONIA OIS, AONIA OIS, CORRA OIS or any other OIS that are subject to the Clearing	
3 Requirement and for which the index has been nominated as an alternative reference rate? If such an amendment is recommended, please discuss a potential timeline for considering and adopting a modification	n CR may be updated to reflect those of UK and EU (e.g. extend SONIA GBP to 50Y).
and the reasons for adopting such timeline.	
A Should the Commission revise the clearing requirement related to the SGD SOR-VWAP rate as part of the initial LIBOR transition or should market participants be given additional time to consider changes to SG	Additional time should be provided for this consideration; neither UK nor EU have
SOR-VWAP Clearing Requirement because it is based on USD LIBOR (and may continue until 2023)?	considered this rate for a CR.
II. SWAP CLEARING REQUIREMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVE REFERENCE RATES	
Are market participants concerned about access to clearing for certain swaps that reference alternative reference rates and are not currently Start Printed Page 66488 subject to the Clearing Requirement? If so	
please explain current or anticipated barriers to clearing swaps in alternative reference rates.	No concerns about access to clearing for certain ARR swaps.
predate explainment of unfadpated butters to detailing swaps in directioner rates.	
6 Are there any steps related to the SOFR transition that have not been completed that would enable a significant number of market participants to submit swaps referencing SOFR to clearing? Are there specific	No outstanding stops to enable clearing of COER swaps
metrics or products associated with the new SOFR rate that need to be developed before swaps referencing SOFR can be used by a broad range of market participants?	No outstanding steps to enable clearing of SOFR swaps.
7 Would requiring the clearing of swaps referencing SOFR or other alternative reference rates that are not currently subject to the Clearing Requirement affect the ability of a DCO to comply with the CEA's core	N/A
rinciples for DCOs?	
Re there specific data the Commission should consider in determining whether significant notional amount and liquidity exists in swaps referencing SOFR or other alternative reference rates that are not	Should consider following criteria in Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA.
currently subject to the Clearing Requirement?	Should consider following criteria in Section 2(11)(2)(b)(11) of the CEA.
a Are there specific thresholds that the Commission should apply with respect to notional amount and liquidity in determining whether swaps referencing SOFR or other alternative reference rates that are not	Charled and idea fallowing with the Coation 2/h/(2//D/(i)) after CFA
urrently subject to the Clearing Requirement should be subject to the clearing requirement?	Should consider following criteria in Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA.
Have market participants observed sufficient outstanding notional exposures and trading liquidity in swaps referencing SOFR during both stressed and non-stressed market conditions to support a clearing	
10 requirement?	Yes
13 Is there adequate pricing data for DCO risk and default management of swaps referencing SOFR? Why or why not?	N/A
What are the challenges that DCOs may face or have faced in accepting new SOFR swaps referencing other alternative reference rates for clearing that are not currently subject to the Clearing	IN/A
	N/A
Requirement from a governance, rule framework, operational, resourcing, or credit support infrastructure perspective?	
13 Would requiring the clearing of swaps referencing SOFR mitigate systemic risk? Please explain why or why not and provide supporting data.	CR might increase the clearing rate and therefore mitigates systemic risk even more, but
	the bulk is already covered by voluntary clearing.
14 Would requiring the clearing of swaps referencing SOFR increase risk to DCOs? If so, are DCOs capable of managing that risk? Please explain why or why not and provide supporting data.	N/A
Would adopting a clearing requirement for swaps referencing SOFR or other alternative reference rates that are not currently subject to the Clearing Requirement materially and beneficially affect trading activity	We do not envision this outcome as long as the CR is added when the product is offered by
in those swaps?	CCPs with sufficient liquidity.
How and when should the Commission evaluate whether to require clearing for interest rate swaps denominated in USD that reference alternative reference rates other than SOFR, such as credit-sensitive	
	Commission should refer to Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA for criteria, though it may be
benchmark rates (e.g., Ameribor and BSBY)? Provided that one or more DCOs have made such swaps available for clearing, are there additional factors or considerations beyond those specified in Section	
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