

From: Elizabeth Zembruski <ezembruski@jhenergy.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2010 9:21 AM
To: dfadefinitions <dfadefinitions@CFTC.gov>
Cc: Keith.Sappenfield@encana.com
Subject: Comments of Encana Marketing (USA) Inc. on Definitions in Dodd-Frank Act
Attach: CFTC-SEC Dodd-Frank Act Definition-EMUS Comments 09-09-2010.pdf

Dear Secretary Stawick:

Attached please find the "Comments of Encana Marketing (USA) Inc. on the Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act."

Regards,

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(202) 429-8800

Counsel for Encana Marketing (USA) Inc.



September 9, 2010

David A. Stawick, Secretary
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20581

Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549-1090

**Subject: Comments of Encana Marketing (USA) Inc. on the Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
SEC File Number S7-16-10**

Dear Secretaries:

Encana Marketing (USA) Inc. (EMUS) hereby files comments on the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in this joint proceeding. EMUS is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Encana Corporation (Encana). Its principal U.S. office is located in Denver, Colorado. EMUS' marketing activities include selling and purchasing natural gas, natural gas liquids, other related energy commodities and services in the U.S. wholesale energy markets. As part of EMUS' marketing activities, Encana, for itself and its subsidiaries, enters into hedging transactions or swaps to manage and mitigate commercial risks associated with EMUS' sales, purchases and movement of these energy commodities. EMUS considers itself to be an end-user of swaps under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Act).

Comments

EMUS supports the "Initial Comments on OTC Rulemakings" filed by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) on August 19, 2010 and incorporates them herein by reference. EMUS also provides the following individual comments on one of the definitions proposed in the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.

EMUS is concerned that EMUS and other end-users could inadvertently fall within the proposed definition of "Major Swap Participant." Accordingly, EMUS requests that the SEC and CFTC, in the development of the definition of "Major Swap Participant," narrow the scope of such definition to clearly


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exclude end-users that use swaps to hedge risk in their ordinary course of business. EMUS encourages the CFTC and SEC to add a provision that explicitly excludes end-users from the definition of "Major Swap Participant".

EMUS believes that, by including an end-user exclusion in the definition of "Major Swap Participant," the definition will implement the legislative intent of Congress in drafting the Act as evidenced by the discussion at the top of page three of the Dodd-Lincoln letter dated June 30, 2010 (copy enclosed).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Keith M. Sappenfield, II". The signature is written in a cursive style with a small "II" at the end.

Keith M. Sappenfield, II
Director, US Regulatory Affairs, Midstream, Marketing and Fundamentals
(720) 876-3693
Keith.sappenfield@encana.com

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 30, 2010

The Honorable Chairman Barney Frank
Financial Services Committee
United States House of Representatives
2129 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Chairman Colin Peterson
Committee on Agriculture
United States House of Representatives
1301 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairmen Frank and Peterson:

Whether swaps are used by an airline hedging its fuel costs or a global manufacturing company hedging interest rate risk, derivatives are an important tool businesses use to manage costs and market volatility. This legislation will preserve that tool. Regulators, namely the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the prudential regulators, must not make hedging so costly it becomes prohibitively expensive for end users to manage their risk. This letter seeks to provide some additional background on legislative intent on some, but not all, of the various sections of Title VII of H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Act.

The legislation does not authorize the regulators to impose margin on end users, those exempt entities that use swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk. If regulators raise the costs of end user transactions, they may create more risk. It is imperative that the regulators do not unnecessarily divert working capital from our economy into margin accounts, in a way that would discourage hedging by end users or impair economic growth.

Again, Congress clearly stated in this bill that the margin and capital requirements are not to be imposed on end users, nor can the regulators require clearing for end user trades. Regulators are charged with establishing rules for the capital requirements, as well as the margin requirements for all uncleared trades, but rules may not be set in a way that requires the imposition of margin requirements on the end user side of a lawful transaction. In cases where a Swap Dealer enters into an uncleared swap with an end user, margin on the dealer side of the transaction should reflect the counterparty risk of the transaction. Congress strongly encourages regulators to

establish margin requirements for such swaps or security-based swaps in a manner that is consistent with the Congressional intent to protect end users from burdensome costs.

In harmonizing the different approaches taken by the House and Senate in their respective derivatives titles, a number of provisions were deleted by the Conference Committee to avoid redundancy and to streamline the regulatory framework. However, a consistent Congressional directive throughout all drafts of this legislation, and in Congressional debate, has been to protect end users from burdensome costs associated with margin requirements and mandatory clearing. Accordingly, changes made in Conference to the section of the bill regulating capital and margin requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants should not be construed as changing this important Congressional interest in protecting end users. In fact, the House offer amending the capital and margin provisions of Sections 731 and 764 expressly stated that the strike to the base text was made "to eliminate redundancy." Capital and margin standards should be set to mitigate risk in our financial system, not punish those who are trying to hedge their own commercial risk.

Congress recognized that the individualized credit arrangements worked out between counterparties in a bilateral transaction can be important components of business risk management. That is why Congress specifically mandates that regulators permit the use of non-cash collateral for counterparty arrangements with Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants to permit flexibility. Mitigating risk is one of the most important reasons for passing this legislation.

Congress determined that clearing is at the heart of reform – bringing transactions and counterparties into a robust, conservative and transparent risk management framework. Congress also acknowledged that clearing may not be suitable for every transaction or every counterparty. End users who hedge their risks may find it challenging to use a standard derivative contracts to exactly match up their risks with counterparties willing to purchase their specific exposures. Standardized derivative contracts may not be suitable for every transaction. Congress recognized that imposing the clearing and exchange trading requirement on commercial end-users could raise transaction costs where there is a substantial public interest in keeping such costs low (i.e., to provide consumers with stable, low prices, promote investment, and create jobs.)

Congress recognized this concern and created a robust end user clearing exemption for those entities that are using the swaps market to hedge or mitigate commercial risk. These entities could be anything ranging from car companies to airlines or energy companies who produce and distribute power to farm machinery manufacturers. They also include captive finance affiliates, finance arms that are hedging in support of manufacturing or other commercial companies. The end user exemption also may apply to our smaller financial entities - credit unions, community banks, and farm credit institutions. These entities did not get us into this crisis and should not be punished for Wall Street's excesses. They help to finance jobs and provide lending for communities all across this nation. That is why Congress provided regulators the authority to exempt these institutions.

This is also why we narrowed the scope of the Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant definitions. We should not inadvertently pull in entities that are appropriately managing their risk. In implementing the Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant provisions, Congress expects the regulators to maintain through rulemaking that the definition of Major Swap Participant does not capture companies simply because they use swaps to hedge risk in their ordinary course of business. Congress does not intend to regulate end-users as Major Swap Participants or Swap Dealers just because they use swaps to hedge or manage the commercial risks associated with their business. For example, the Major Swap Participant and Swap Dealer definitions are not intended to include an electric or gas utility that purchases commodities that are used either as a source of fuel to produce electricity or to supply gas to retail customers and that uses swaps to hedge or manage the commercial risks associated with its business. Congress incorporated a de minimis exception to the Swap Dealer definition to ensure that smaller institutions that are responsibly managing their commercial risk are not inadvertently pulled into additional regulation.

Just as Congress has heard the end user community, regulators must carefully take into consideration the impact of regulation and capital and margin on these entities.

It is also imperative that regulators do not assume that all over-the-counter transactions share the same risk profile. While uncleared swaps should be looked at closely, regulators must carefully analyze the risk associated with cleared and uncleared swaps and apply that analysis when setting capital standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants. As regulators set capital and margin standards on Swap Dealers or Major Swap Participants, they must set the appropriate standards relative to the risks associated with trading. Regulators must carefully consider the potential burdens that Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants may impose on end user counterparties – especially if those requirements will discourage the use of swaps by end users or harm economic growth. Regulators should seek to impose margins to the extent they are necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of the Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants.

Congress determined that end users must be empowered in their counterparty relationships, especially relationships with swap dealers. This is why Congress explicitly gave to end users the option to clear swaps contracts, the option to choose their clearinghouse or clearing agency, and the option to segregate margin with an independent 3rd party custodian.


In implementing the derivatives title, Congress encourages the CFTC to clarify through rulemaking that the exclusion from the definition of swap for “any sale of a nonfinancial commodity or security for deferred shipment or delivery, so long as the transaction is intended to be physically settled” is intended to be consistent with the forward contract exclusion that is currently in the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC’s established policy and orders on this subject, including situations where commercial parties agree to “book-out” their physical delivery obligations under a forward contract.

Congress recognized that the capital and margin requirements in this bill could have an impact on swaps contracts currently in existence. For this reason, we provided legal certainty to those contracts currently in existence, providing that no contract could be terminated, renegotiated,


modified, amended, or supplemented (unless otherwise specified in the contract) based on the implementation of any requirement in this Act, including requirements on Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants. It is imperative that we provide certainty to these existing contracts for the sake of our economy and financial system.

Regulators must carefully follow Congressional intent in implementing this bill. While Congress may not have the expertise to set specific standards, we have laid out our criteria and guidelines for implementing reform. It is imperative that these standards are not punitive to the end users, that we encourage the management of commercial risk, and that we build a strong but responsive framework for regulating the derivatives market.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Christopher Dodd in cursive script.

Chairman Christopher Dodd
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
United States Senate

Handwritten signature of Blanche Lincoln in cursive script.

Chairman Blanche Lincoln
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
United States Senate